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Recent Developments 
Baker v. General Motors, Corp.: 
Reversing the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, the 
Supreme Court in Baker v. 
General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 
657 (1998), held that an 
injunction barring an employee 
from testifying against his former 
employer did not prevent him 
from testifying in a proceeding in 
another state pursuant to a 
subpoena issued in that state. 
The decision illustrates the 
Court's intent to prevent a state 
from interfering in matters which it 
lacks authority to resolve under 
the ambit of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution. 
The Court maintained that it was 
not creating an exception to the 
requirement of full faith and credit, 
it was simply recognizing that a 
judgment granted in one state 
cannot determine evidentiary 
issues in a suit brought in another 
state. 
For the fifteen years 
preceding this litigation, Ronald 
Elwell ("Elwell") was employed by 
General Motors Corporation 
("GM") as an engineer analyst. 
His primary responsibility was to 
evaluate the performance of GM 
vehicles and make 
recommendations for 
improvement. He also served as 
an expert witness for GM in 
products liability actions, 
defending the safety and crash 
worthiness of GM vehicles. After 
the employment relationship 
soured, and Elwell agreed to 
retire within two years, Elwell was 
subpoenaed to testify in a 
Georgia products liability action 
against GM. He testified that the 
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fuel system of the GM vehicle in 
which plaintiffs decedent was 
riding was inferior in comparison 
with other vehicles in its class. 
The following year, Elwell sued 
GM in Michigan for wrongful 
discharge and other tort and 
contract claims. In its 
counterclaim, GM alleged that 
Elwell had breached his fiduciary 
duty to GM by disclosing 
privileged information by testifying 
in the Georgia action. 
In August, 1992, Elwell and 
GM entered into an agreement 
under which Elwell agreed to a 
permanent injunction barring him 
from testifying as a witness in any 
litigation involving GM. Although 
the only specific exception to the 
injunction was in reference to the 
Georgia action in which Elwell 
had already been deposed, the 
agreement contained a general 
exception as well. GM and Elwell 
agreed that if Elwell's testimony 
was ordered by another court, 
compliance with that order would 
not be actionable as a violation of 
the injunction. Since the 
injunction was entered, Elwell 
testified against GM in several 
jurisdictions pursuant to 
subpoenas ordering his 
appearance. 
The current action involved 
one of the cases in which Elwell 
had been ordered to testify. 
Kenneth and Steven Baker sued 
GM in Missouri claiming their 
mother died in a collision in which 
the GM vehicle she was driving 
caught fire because of a faulty 
fuel pump. The Bakers sought to 
depose Elwell as a witness and 
GM objected based on the 
injunction obtained in Michigan. 
The Bakers maintained that the 
Michigan injunction did not 
override a Missouri subpoena 
and pOinted out the general 
exception in the injunction which 
provided that Elwell could testify 
in an action if a court so ordered. 
After reviewing the Michigan 
injunction, the Federal District 
Court in Missouri allowed Elwell 
to testify at trial. The court held 
that enforcing the injunction would 
violate Missouri's public policy 
which only shielded from 
disclosure privileged or 
confidential information. 
The United States Court of ~ 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court's 
decision by holding that the 
district court erroneously relied on 
Missouri's public policy favoring 
the disclosure of information that 
is not privileged. The court of 
appeals held that Missouri has an 
equally strong public policy 
favoring that full faith and credit 
be given to judgments obtained in 
other states. The Supreme Court 
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granted certiorari to decide 
whether the full faith and credit 
requirement estopped the Bakers 
from procuring Elwell's testimony 
in their Missouri lawsuit against 
GM. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663. 
The Court noted that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of Article 
IV of the United States 
Constitution provides that a 
judgment granted in one state, 
"qualifies for recognition 
throughout the land," provided 
that it was granted by a court with 
authority over the persons and 
subject matter of the suit. Id. at 
663-664. Therefore, for purposes 
of claim and issue preclusion, a 
judgment granted in one state 
warrants recognition nationwide. 
Id. at 664. 
Observance of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause does not 
compel a state to follow another 
state's procedures for enforcing 
judgments. Id. at 665. Further, 
judgments granted in one state 
that have interfered with litigation 
over which the granting state had 
no authority have been denied 
enforcement and held ineffective. 
Id. at 665 (citing Fall v. Eastin, 
215 U.S. 1 (1909)). 
While maintaining the effects 
of the Michigan judgment 
between Elwell and GM could not 
be extended beyond 
controversies under the specific 
control of the Michigan court, the 
Court noted that the injunction 
could operate "to preclude [Elwell] 
from volunteering his testimony" 
in pending or future litigation in 
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Michigan. Id. at 667. However, 
the Court stated, this judgment 
does not operate to dictate to a 
court in another state that 
relevant evidence should be 
deemed inadmissable based on 
the injunction. Id. The Court held 
that "Michigan's power does not 
reach into a Missouri courtroom 
to displace the forum's own 
determination whether to admit or 
exclude evidence relevant" in the 
case before it. Id. 
. According to the Court, this 
ruling did not suggest that a state 
may refuse to honor another 
state's judgments based on public 
policy preferences or that this is 
an exception to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. Id. It merely 
preserves the concept that an 
injunction awarded in Michigan 
cannot operate to determine 
evidentiary issues in a suit 
pending in Missouri when the 
parties were not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Michigan court. 
Id. This does not, as Justice 
Kennedy wrote in his concurring 
opinion, compel a sweeping 
exception to the full faith and 
credit requirement. Id. at 670 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). This 
judgment, according to the 
majority, is denied full faith and 
credit protection because it 
attempted to interfere with claims 
that were not under the control of 
the Michigan court. Id. at 667. 
As Justice Scalia pOinted out in 
his concurring opinion, "[t]he 
Missouri court was no more 
obliged to enforce the Michigan 
injunction by preventing Elwell 
from presenting his testimony 
than it was obliged to enforce it by 
holding Elwell in contempt." Id. at 
668 (Scalia, J., concurring). In 
other words, full faith and credit 
does not require Missouri to 
execute the injunction which was 
granted in Michigan and if GM 
wishes the Michigan injunction to 
be given force in Missouri, it must 
be made a judgment in Missouri. 
Id. 
Holding that a state has no 
authority to control proceedings 
outside its jurisdiction by shielding 
a witness from the state's 
subpoena power, the Supreme 
Court clarified the fact that 
recognition under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause is only owed to 
matters that the state which 
issued the judgment has authority 
to resolve. This decision narrows 
the options for businesses 
attempting to keep information 
acquired during the employment 
relationship confidential. Knowing 
that a court- ordered injunction 
may not be given full effect in 
proceedings outside the state in 
which it was granted, employers 
may be less willing to offer 
consideration for an employee's 
silence regarding potentially 
damaging information. It may 
also make products liability 
actions easier to litigate because 
it opens the door to the use of 
vicarious admission testimony, 
thereby giving plaintiffs a vehicle 
through which to gain important 
evidence. 
